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21. INTRODUCTION
Starting from Strotz (1956), choice problems with dynamically inconsistent prefer-
ences have been studied extensively1. There is a small but growing literature that
studies the properties of competitive equilibrium models with dynamically incon-
sistent preferences2. The representative agent economy is a particularly simple (and
widely used) model in macroeconomics and finance where both issues of optimiza-
tion and market clearing arise3. This paper shows the robust non existence of com-
petitive equilibria even in a simple deterministic three period representative agent
economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences.
We distinguish between a naive and sophisticated representative agent. We for-
mulate the decision problem of a sophisticated representative agent as an intra-
personal game at given prices. In our simple exchange economy there is only one
candidate market clearing allocation, namely one in which the representative agent
consumes his endowments. We show, via a robust example, that there are no prices
such that, at the solution of the intra-personal game, the representative agent con-
sumes his endowments.
The models of Barro (1999), Kocherlakota (2001) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003)
allow for the possibility of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: under the key assump-
tion that agents have identical discount functions and identical CRRA period utility
functions, whether discounting is quasi-hyperbolic is irrelevant and existence is not
an issue. Closer to the work reported here, Luttmer and Mariotti (2006), Herings
and Rohde (2006), Luttmer andMariotti (2007) have shown that equilibria exist with
general classes of dynamically inconsistent preferences4.
1Pollak (1968), Blackorby, Nissen, Primont, and Russell (1973), Peleg and Yaari
(1973), Goldman (1980), Harris and Laibson (2001), Caplin and Leahy (2006) among
others.
2Barro (1999), Kocherlakota (2001), Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), Luttmer and Mar-
iotti (2006), Herings and Rohde (2006), Luttmer and Mariotti (2007), Herings and
Rohde (2008).
3Caplin and Leahy (2001), Kocherlakota (2001), Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), among
others, introduce dynamically inconsistent preferences in the representative agent
economy.
4Observe that the preferences studied in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and Luttmer
and Mariotti (2007) satisfy quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997)) and are,
by construction, time separable. In Herings and Rohde (2006), preferences are inde-
pendent of past consumption (like the preferences studied by us here) but, unlike us,
they study existence in a market structure that is not sequentially complete.
3In our example the dynamically inconsistent preferences that we study do not
satisfy the assumption of time separability5 and result in induced preferences over
choices in first period markets that are non convex and satiated. At given prices, in
our example, such induced preferences display satiation because the amount con-
sumed by the second period “self”is a decreasing function of the amount saved by
the first period “self”. Further, at given prices, the induced preferences over first
period choices fail to be convex as anticipated second and third period consumption
are no longer concave functions of first period savings. We show that the market
clearing allocation does not lie in the convex hull of demand even allowing for neg-
ative prices and hence the non-existence result.6 Finally, with a naive representative
agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and indi-
vidual optimization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the three
period representative agent economy, in section 3 we present the non existence ex-
ample with a sophisticated representative agent, while in section 4 we study exis-
tence with a naive representative agent.
2. THE ECONOMY
We consider a simple representative agent economy over three periods, labeled by
t, t = 1, 2, 3. There is a single asset (the tree) which delivers units of a consumption
good (dividends or fruit) in every period. The consumption good is non storable,
hence the asset provides the only way to transfer wealth across periods. Let ct denote
consumption in period t, t = 1, 2, 3. Let θt+1 denote the amount of the asset held by
the representative agent at the beginning of period t + 1. Then θt+1dt+1 denotes the
amount of the consumption good available for consumption at t+ 1.
5See Caplin and Leahy (2001). Among other specific properties, their model features
both uncertainty and non-time separable preferences in an intrinsic way. As our
analysis is limited to the deterministic case, we focus on the implications of non-
time separable preferences that such a model may have. Time separability will also
be violated in models of habit persistence although we do not explicitly focus on this
case in this paper.
6Luttmer andMariotti (2006), Herings and Rohde (2006), Luttmer andMariotti (2007)
deal only with potential non convexities, but not with satiation. Herings and Rohde
(2006) prove existence in the case in which induced preferences are convex by as-
sumption. Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) prove ex-
istence in a large economy by proving that there exist prices such that the market
clearing allocation lies in the convex hull of demand.
4We assume the representative agent is a price taker for both the consumption good
and the asset. We normalize prices so that the price of the consumption good is fixed
at 1 in each period, with pt denoting the relative price of the asset in period t. The
model is completely deterministic and the values of all fundamentals are known
from the beginning by the agent. At the beginning of period 1, the agent is endowed
with the entire asset (θ1 = 1) and the entire paid dividend d1.
At each t, we assume that the agent has preferences ranking non negative com-
modity bundles. We assume that at each t, t = 1, 2, the preferences of the representa-
tive agent over consumption are represented by the utility function ut(ct, ..., c3). We
assume that at each t, t = 1, 2 ut(ct, ..., c3)
7 is smooth, strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave.
We say preferences are dynamically inconsistent if given some non-negative c1 the
projection of preferences of the representative agent at t = 1 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+ are
different from his preferences at t = 2 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+, or equivalently, for some
non-negative c1,
∂u1
∂c3
(c1,c2,c3)
∂u1
∂c2
(c1,c2,c3)
6=
∂u2
∂c3
(c2,c3)
∂u2
∂c2
(c2,c3)
, (c2, c3)∈ R2+.8
In the remainder of the paper we assume that the preferences of the representative
agent are dynamically inconsistent.
We consider the case where the representative agent is sophisticated, i.e. correctly
anticipates that at t = 2 he will re-optimize, given his choices made at t = 1. At given
prices pt, t = 1, 2, the decision problem of the sophisticated representative agent is
described by the following intra-personal game:
Players: each period t, t = 1, 2, the representative agent is considered as a dis-
tinct autonomous player.
Actions: At = {(ct, θt+1) ∈ R2+ : ct + ptθt+1 ≤ (pt + dt)θt} constitutes the set of
actions available to player t.
Histories: the set of possible histories at t = 2 is H1 = A1, while the set of
histories at t = 1,H0 is a singleton.
Strategies: a strategy for the date t consumer is a Borel measurable function
γt : Ht−1 → ∆(At).
7Clearly, as u1(.) depends on c1, c2 and c3 but u2(.) depends on c2 and c3 but not c1,
the preferences studied here are consistent with anticipatory feelings but not with
habit persistence.
8As preferences are monotonic over consumption in each period, the optimal period
3 choice is to always choose maximum feasible consumption. It follows that the asset
price in period 3 is zero. In this 3 period economy our exclusive focus is on the time
inconsistency between periods 1 and 2.
5Definition 1. At prices p1, p2, a Sophisticated Solution (SS) γ is a Strotz (1956) solution
i.e. for each player t, γt induces a level of consumption which maximizes its own
utility given any feasible history of choices and the utility maximizing strategies of
the future.
Remark. From definition 1, at given prices, it follows that a SS is a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the intra-personal game, although, in general, the converse
does not hold. In general, the two solution concepts would not coincide if there are
multiple payoff maximizing consumption choices in some subgame for the period-2
consumer. However in our economy, as the second period utility is strictly quasi-
concave guaranteeing a unique solution in each subgame, the two solution concepts
coincide.
The market clearing condition for this economy is trivial: the agent must hold the
entire unit of the asset in each period (θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1) and consumption must be
equal to the entire dividend paid in each period (c1 = d1, c2 = d2, c3 = d3).
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent is a com-
bination of prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) and allocation (θ
∗
1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) such that:
(i) (θ∗1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) is the outcome of SS at prices (p
∗
1, p
∗
2);
(ii) (c∗1 = d1, θ
∗
2 = 1, c
∗
2 = d2, θ
∗
3 = 1, c
∗
3 = d3).
Note that by construction at a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated repre-
sentative agent both selves of the representative agent face the same prices, i.e. the
sophisticated representative agent at t = 1 must correctly forecast the asset price at
t = 2. The definition of a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated agent cor-
responds to the notion of a sophisticated equilibrium in Herrings and Rhode (2006)
and to the notion of a competitive equilibrium in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006).
A weaker definition of competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representa-
tive agent would allow for the possibility that the market clearing allocation lies
in the convex hull of demand. To this end, at prices p1, p2, given a strategy γ,
we define the demand correspondence: D(p1, p2) = {(c1, θ2, c2, θ3, c3) ∈ ℜ5 : each
(c1, θ2, c2, θ3, c3) is an outcome of SS at prices (p1, p2)}. Even though preferences are
strictly quasi-concave, the demand correspondence can be multi-valued in our set-
ting as the induced preferences of the sophisticated representative agent at t = 1may
fail to be convex. Let Conv(D(p1, p2)) denote the convex hull of the demand corre-
spondence i.e. the intersection of all convex sets containing D(p1, p2; γ). A weaker
notion of a competitive equilibrium follows:
6Definition 3. A weak competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent is
a combination of prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) such that:
(i) each (c1, θ2, c2, θ3, c3) ∈ D(p∗1, p∗2);
(ii) (c∗1 = d1, θ
∗
2 = 1, c
∗
2 = d2, θ
∗
3 = 1, c
∗
3 = d3) ∈ Conv(D(p∗1, p∗2)).
At a weak competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent, as
the market clearing allocation lies in the convex hull of the demand, market clear-
ing is only obtained in expectation (equivalently, market clearing obtains in a re-
interpretation of our model where the representative agent is a collection of a con-
tinuum of identical individuals).
Proposition 1. (Non existence). Not only does a competitive equilibrium with a sophisti-
cated representative agent not always exist but even a weak competitive equilibrium with a
sophisticated representative agent does not always exist.
In the following section we prove the proposition with a robust example.
3. AN EXAMPLE OF NON EXISTENCE
In this section we construct a robust example, where utility is increasing, smooth
and strictly quasi-concave, but where a competitive equilibriumwith a sophisticated
representative agent does not exist. In this example at any fixed configuration of
asset prices, by backward induction, the representative agent at t = 1 anticipates
how the demand of his future self at t = 2 for θ3 varies as a function of the amount
of θ2 he chooses to hold. The resulting induced preferences over θ2 at t = 1 are non-
convex and satiated. We, then, show that there is no market clearing asset price at
t = 1 for such an induced preference.
The non-existence result is due to the fact that, in our example, consumption does
not always increase monotonically in wealth. In order to have a well behaved util-
ity function such that consumption may be an inferior good over certain ranges of
wealth, we use the addilog preferences which have been introduced by Houthakker
(1960).9
We begin by specifying the utility function at each t for the representative agent.
At t = 1 the utility function of the representative agent is:
(1) U1(c1, c2, c3) = c1 + b ln(c2) + c ln(c3),
9Concavity of the single period utility functions together with time separability im-
ply that every period consumption is a normal good. In our example this is not
always the case as the period 2 player’s preferences are not time separable.
7where b ∈ (0, 1), c ∈ (0, 1) and b > c.
We assume that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 generates
the following indirect addilog utility function:
(2) V2(p2, θ2) = α2
(θ2(p2 + d2))
β2
β2
+ α3
(d3θ2(p2 + d2)/p2)
β3
β3
,
where θ2(p2 + d2) is the wealth of the representative agent at t = 2 and p2/d3 is the
price of consumption at t = 3, c3 = θ3d3.
10 This class of indirect utility functions
was introduced by Houthakker (1960). Expression (2) draws on the work of Murthy
(1982). Consistent with his assumptions we assume that the underlying preference
and wealth parameters take the following values:
(3) β2 = −0.5, β3 = 1, α2 = 0.2, α3 = 0.8, d1 = d2 = d3 = 1.
de Boer, Bro¨cker, Jensen, and van Daal (2006) formally prove that when the β ′s are
strictly greater than -1 and the α’s add up to 1 the indirect utility function satisfies
the following properties:
(i) homogeneous of degree zero in p2 and θ2,
(ii) non-increasing in p2 and nondecreasing in θ2,
(iii) strictly quasi-convex in p2,
(iv) differentiable in p2 and θ2.
The fact that the indirect utility function is strictly quasi-convex in prices implies
that the direct utility function, i.e. the dual of (2), is strictly quasi-concave by a well
known result in duality theory 11.
Next we compute the asset demand functions at t = 2. Given that the utility
function at t = 2 is strictly quasi-concave, we can apply Roy’s Lemma and obtain:
(4) c2 =
α2(θ2(p2 + d2))
β2+1
α2(θ2(p2 + d2))β2 + α3(θ2(p2 + d2)/p2)β3
.
It follows that as the period 2 budget constraint is satisfied with the equality, the
demand for θ3 at t = 2 as a function of θ2, p2 is
(5) θ3(θ2, p2) =
θ2(p2 + d2)− c2
p2
.
10Since the optimal period 3 choice is to always choose maximum feasible consump-
tion, without loss of generality, the asset price in period 3 is zero.
11See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), page 66.
8Re-expressing c1, c2 and c3 through the three inter-temporal budget constraints (sat-
isfied in each case as an equality) and using d1 = d2 = d3 = 1, we obtain the period 1
indirect utility function:
(6) V1(p1, p2, θ2) = p1 − p1θ2 + b ln(p2θ2 − p2θ3(θ2, p2)) + c ln(θ3(θ2p2)).
Lemma 1. The market clearing price at t = 2 such that θ∗2 = θ
∗
3 = 1 is p
∗
2 = 18.7.
Proof. At the market clearing price vector it must be optimal for the representative
agent to demand θ∗2 = θ
∗
3 = 1.
Using equation (4), we look for the p2 such that the representative agent demands
the market clearing quantities c2 = d2, θ2 = 1. Given the specified values β2 =
−0.5, β3 = 1, α2 = 0.2, α3 = 0.8, d2 = 1 we obtain the following equation:
(7) (p∗2)
2(p∗2 + 1)
−3/2 = α3/α2.
Given that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 is strongly mono-
tone, the market clearing price at t = 2 must be positive. There exists only one
positive solution to (7), namely p∗2 = 18.7 and this is the market clearing price at
t = 2. 
The preceding lemma computes the unique second period asset price that sup-
ports the market clearing allocation as the optimal choice of a period-2 consumer.
Lemma 2. There exists aK strictly positive such that whenever b/c > K then
∂V1(p1,p∗2,θ2)
∂θ2
<
0, θ2 ≥ 1 at each p1 ≥ 0.
Proof. Plugging the values of the parameters and p∗2 = 18.7 into (4) we can re-express
the demand for c2 at t = 2, given p
∗
2 = 18.7, as a function of θ2:
c2(θ2, p
∗
2) =
.88
√
θ2
.84θ2 + .04/
√
θ2
.
By computation note that
∂c2(θ2,p∗2)
∂θ2
= −hy
2
(θ
3/2
2
− 2z
y
)
(yθ
3/2
2
+z)2
, where h = .88,y = .84, z = .04.
Notice that hy is strictly positive as it is the denominator of the fraction, however as
2z < y, for θ2 ≥ 1, θ3/22 − 2zy > 0. Hence, c2 is an inferior good at t = 2 over some
range of income.
9Substituting the expression for c2(θ2, p
∗
2) into (5) and (6) we obtain the period 1
indirect utility as a function of p1 and θ2 alone:
(8) V1(p1, θ2) = p1 +1− p1θ2 + b ln( .88
√
θ2
.84θ2 + .04/
√
θ2
)+ c ln(1.05θ2− .047
√
θ2
.84θ2 + .04/
√
θ2
).
Let
p1 + 1− p1θ2 ≡ A,
b ln(
.88
√
θ2
.84θ2 + .04/
√
θ2
) ≡ b ln( hθ2
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) ≡ B,
where h ≡ .88, y ≡ .84, z ≡ .04.
c ln(1.05θ2 − .047
√
θ2
.84θ2 + .04/
√
θ2
) ≡ c ln(kθ2 − xθ2
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) ≡ C,
where k ≡ 1.05, x ≡ .047, y ≡ .84, z ≡ .04.
By computation notice that as long as p1 ≥ 0, ∂A∂θ2 = −p1 ≤ 0. Let
f(θ2) =
θ2
yθ
3/2
2 + z
> 0, θ2 ≥ 1.
Hence, B = b ln(hf(θ2)) and C = c ln(kθ2 − xf(θ2)). Now
f ′(θ2) =
−y(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )
2
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)2 < 0, ∀ θ2 ≥ 1
and
∂B
∂θ2
= b
f ′(θ2)
f(θ2)
,
∂C
∂θ2
= c
(k − xf ′(θ2))
(kθ2 − xf(θ2)) .
Under the values of the parameters assumed so far, (k − xf ′(θ2)) > 0 and kθ2 −
xf(θ2) > 0 ∀ θ2 ≥ 1. Therefore, ∂B∂θ2 < 0 and ∂C∂θ2 > 0 for all θ2 ≥ 1 i.e. second period
consumption is an inferior good and third period consumption a normal good for
the period-1 consumer. Further,
∂(B + C)
∂θ2
< 0⇔ bf
′(θ2)
f(θ2)
< −c (k − xf
′(θ2))
(kθ2 − xf(θ2))
or equivalently,
b
c
> − f(θ2)
f ′(θ2)
(k − xf ′(θ2))
(kθ2 − xf(θ2)) > 0.
10
By substitution and simplification, it follows that
∂(B + C)
∂θ2
< 0 iff
b
c
> K(θ2) =
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)2
+
(
xy
2
)
(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )[
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
− x
] (
y
2
)
(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )
.
As long as θ2 ≥ 1, the denominator of K(θ2) is bounded away from zero so that for
any finite value of θ2 ≥ 1, K(θ2) is bounded. Let
K1(θ2) = k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)2
+
(xy
2
)
(θ
3
2
2 −
2z
y
),
K2(θ2) =
[
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
− x
] (y
2
)
(θ
3
2
2 −
2z
y
).
By computation,
K ′1(θ2) =
3
2
θ
1/2
2
[
2k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
+
(xy
2
)]
,
K ′2(θ2) =
(y
2
) 3
2
θ
1/2
2
[
ky(θ
3
2
2 −
2z
y
) +
(
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
− x
)]
As K ′1(θ2) > 0 and K
′
2(θ2) > 0 for θ2 large enough, both limθ2→+∞K1(θ2) = ∞ and
limθ2→+∞K2(θ2) =∞. By L’Hospital’s rule, limθ2→+∞K(θ2) = limθ2→+∞ K
′
1
(θ2)
K ′
2
(θ2)
. Now,
lim
θ2→+∞
K ′1(θ2)
K ′2(θ2)
= lim
θ2→+∞
[
2k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
+
(
xy
2
)]
(
y
2
) [
ky(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy ) +
(
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)
− x
)]
= lim
θ2→+∞
[
2 +
(xy
2
)
k
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
)
]
(
y
2
) [ y(θ 32
2
−
2z
y
)(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
) +
(
1− x
k
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
)
)] .
11
Now, limθ2→+∞
[
2 +
(xy
2
)
k
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
)
]
= 2 +
(
limθ2→+∞
(xy
2
)
k
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
)
)
= 2 and
lim
θ2→+∞
(y
2
) y(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) +

1− x
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)




=
(y
2
)

 lim
θ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)

+

 lim
θ2→+∞

1− x
k
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)






=
(y
2
)

 lim
θ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)

+ 1


= y
where the last equality follows as, by another application of L’Hospital’s rule, limθ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2
− 2z
y
)(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
) =
limθ2→+∞
(3/2)yθ
1
2
2
(3/2)yθ
1
2
2
= 1. Therefore, limθ2→+∞K(θ2) = limθ2→+∞
K ′
1
(θ2)
K ′
2
(θ2)
= 2
y
> 0. There-
fore, there exists aK > 0 such that sup
θ2≥1
K(θ2) ≤ K and ∂(B+C)∂θ2 < 0 if bc > K. It follows
that there exists a K strictly positive, such that at any p1 ≥ 0, whenever b/c > K,
∂V1(p1,p∗2,θ2)
∂θ2
< 0, ∀ θ2 ≥ 1. 
The preceding lemma establishes that, at any positive first period asset price, the
(indirect) marginal utility of the period-1 consumer in θ2, evaluated at p
∗
2, is negative
whenever θ2 ≥ 1. Observe that we have to consider unbounded values of θ2 in
lemma 2 as we allow for the possibility that p2 = 0.
In the next lemma we will allow for a negative asset price at t = 1. Observe that
the reason for this is implicit in the calculations underlying lemma 2: it is that for
each p1 ≥ 0, V1(p1, θ2) attains a maximum at some value θ2 < 1. Note that in this case
with p1 < 0 the budget constraint at t = 1 is: θ2 ≥ 1 + d1/p1 − c1/p1, which imposes a
lower bound on θ2.
Lemma 3. There exists a K strictly positive such that whenever b/c > K, (a) there exists
p∗1 < 0 such that
∂V1(p∗1,p
∗
2
,θ2=1)
∂θ2
= 0, however (b) lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1(p∗1,p
∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
= −p∗1 > 0.
Proof. By computation observe that p∗1 =
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
|θ2=1 < 0. Moreover ∂V1(p
∗
1
,p∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
=
−p∗1 + ∂(B+C)∂θ2 . By lemma 2 ∂C∂θ2 = c
(k−xf ′(θ2))
(kθ2−xf(θ2))
≥ 0, θ2 ≥ 1. It follows that ∂B∂θ2 ≤
12
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
< 0. Using the expressions derived in lemma 2,
lim
θ2→+∞
∂B
∂θ2
= lim
θ2→+∞
b
f ′(θ2)
f(θ2)
= −b

 lim
θ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2 − 2zy )
2θ2
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
)


As the both the numerator and denominator of
y(θ
3
2
2
−
2x
y
)
2θ2
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
) goes to +∞ as θ2 → +∞,
using L’Hospital’s rule
lim
θ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2 − 2xy )
2θ2
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) = 1
2
(
lim
θ2→+∞
y
(
3
2
)
θ
1/2
2
yθ
3/2
2 + z + θ2y
(
3
2
)
θ
1/2
2
)
=
1
2

 lim
θ2→+∞
1
yθ
3/2
2
+z
y( 3
2
)θ1/22
+ θ2

 .
Now, lim
θ2→+∞
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
y( 3
2
)θ1/22
+ θ2
)
= lim
θ2→+∞
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
y( 3
2
)θ1/22
)
+ lim
θ2→+∞
θ2. Again, by using L’Hospital’s
rule
lim
θ2→+∞
(
yθ
3/2
2 + z
y
(
3
2
)
θ
1/2
2
)
= lim
θ2→+∞
(
y
(
3
2
)
θ
1/2
2
y
(
3
4
)
θ
−(1/2)
2
)
= lim
θ2→+∞
(2θ2)
so that lim
θ2→+∞
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
y( 3
2
)θ1/22
+ θ2
)
= ∞. Therefore lim
θ2→+∞
y(θ
3
2
2
− 2x
y
)
2θ2
(
yθ
3/2
2
+z
) = 0 which, in turn,
implies that lim
θ2→+∞
∂B
∂θ2
= 0− and hence lim
θ2→+∞
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
= 0−. Therefore lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) =
−p∗1 > 0. 
Lemma shows that at the unique period one asset price p∗1 (so that choosing θ2 = 1
satisfies the first-order condition characterizing an interior optima holds) also has the
property that the marginal (indirect) utility of holding an extra unit of the period one
asset is also strictly positive for large values of θ2. In the following lemma, we show
that that θ2 = 1 is never an optimal choice even allowing for a negative asset price
at t = 1. In addition we also show that θ2 = 1 does not belong to the convex hull of
demand even allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1. The latter statement implies
that, even if we re-interpret the model so that the representative agent is a collection
of a continuum of identical individuals, equilibrium existence is not restored.
13
Lemma 4. Given lemmas 1, 2, 3, θ2 = 1 is not an element of the convex hull of demand even
allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1 so that neither a competitive equilibrium, nor a
weak competitive equilibrium, with a sophisticated representative agent exists.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that with a sophisticated representative agent there is a
unique p∗2 candidate equilibrium price at period 2. For an equilibrium to exist, given
p∗2, there must be a p
∗
1 such that for the representative agent θ
∗
2 = 1 is a SS.
There are two cases to consider.
1. p1 ≥ 0: fix a (p1, p∗2), p1 ≥ 0, by lemma 2 θ2 = 1 is never an optimal solution.
Next, observe that a necessary condition for θ2 = 1 to be in the convex hull of indi-
vidual demand is that ∂V1
∂θ2
(p1, p
∗
2, θ
′
2) = 0 for some θ
′
2 < 1 and
∂V1
∂θ2
(p1, p
∗
2, θ
′′
2) = 0 for
some θ′′2 > 1, a possibility ruled out by lemma 2. It follows that θ2 = 1 is not in the
convex hull of individual demand.
2. p1 < 0: by lemma 3, in order to ensure that θ2 = 1 is chosen at t = 1 it nec-
essarily follows that the only candidate equilibrium price is p1 = p
∗
1. Further by
lemma 3 there exists θ2 > 1 such that for all θ2 > θ2,
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) > 0. Therefore
lim
θ2→+∞
V1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, θ2) = lim
θ2→+∞
∫ θ2
θ
2
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2)+V1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, θ2) = +∞ as lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) =
−p∗1. It follows that at prices (p∗1, p∗2), θ2 = 1 cannot be an optimal choice for the rep-
resentative agent.
It remains to check that θ2 = 1 is not in the convex hull of demand when p1 <
0. By computation, observe that for any θˆ2 > 1, a necessary condition for θˆ2 to be
an optimal choice is that p1 = p
∗
1(θˆ2) =
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
|θˆ2 < 0. Moreover using arguments
analogous to lemma 3, it is verified that lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1(p∗1(θˆ2),p
∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
= −p∗1(θˆ2) and hence
lim
θ2→+∞
V1(p
∗
1(θˆ2), p
∗
2, θ2) = +∞. Therefore, there is no p1 < 0 for which there is some
θˆ2 > 1 such that θˆ2 is an optimal choice. It follows that θ2 = 1 cannot be in the convex
hull of individual demand. 
Note that the above non existence result is robust to small variations in parameter
values by the continuity of the derivatives of the utility functions in these parame-
ters.
Remarks. The feature that implies the nonexistence result in our example is the fact
that period 2 consumption is an inferior good from the perspective of the period 2
decision maker, but it is a normal good from the perspective of the period 1 decision
maker and this implies that the period 1 consumer demand for period 2 wealth, i.e.
for θ2, is satiated. The papers of Luttmer and Mariotti (2006), Herings and Rohde
14
(2006), Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) are able to prove existence because the issue of
inferior goods and satiation and does not arise in their papers. With sequentially
complete markets, concavity of the single period utility functions together with time
separability imply that both c2 and c3 are normal goods for the period 2 consumer
and this is enough to avoid satiation in period 1, because if both c2 and c3 increase
in θ2, then for the period 1 consumer utility monotonically increases in θ2. In such
a situation, the existence of an equilibrium price p∗1 such that the period 1 market
clearing quantity θ2 = 1 belongs to the convex hull of the demand correspondence
can be proved with a standard fixed point argument.12 A necessary condition to re-
establish the existence of the competitive equilibrium allowing for a large number of
identical consumers is that there is at least one optimal quantity θ′2 which is smaller
than the market clearing quantity θ2 = 1 and at least one optimal quantity θ
′′
2 which
is greater. In our example, allowing for a large large number of identical consumers
does not successfully reestablish the existence of a competitive equilibrium because,
for any positive p1, (8) decreases in θ2 for all θ2 ≥ 1 and this implies that θ2 = 1
cannot belong to the convex hull of the demand function. This happens because c2
is an inferior commodity for all θ2 ≥ 1 and, given the values of the discount factors
b and c, the cost of a marginal decrease in c2 is greater than the benefit of a marginal
increase in c3 for the period 1 decision maker.
Negative prices can generally reestablish the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium which fails to exist because of satiation, when free disposal is not allowed, as
it happens in our example. In the case of negative p1, the period 1 budget constraint
is: θ2 ≥ 1 + d1/p1 − c1/p1, i.e. with a negative p1 there is no upper bound on the
quantity of θ2 which the consumer can demand and there is instead a lower bound.
We have proved that any negative p1 cannot re-establish the competitive equilibrium
in our example showing that, given any negative p1, the unique optimal choice for
the period 1 consumer is to demand a quantity of θ2 which goes to +∞ implying
non-vanishing excess demand.
4. EQUILIBRIUM WITH NAIVE AGENTS
In this section we study equilibria with a naive representative agent.
12The convex hull of the individual excess of demand of the period 1 consumer is
convex (trivial) and has a closed graph (implied by the upper hemicontinuity and
compact-valuedness of the demand function and the monotonicity of the preference
for θ2).
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Fix pt, t = 1, 2. When the representative agent is naive at t = 1, he does not antic-
ipate that at t = 2 consumption and asset choices will be re-optimized. Therefore at
t = 1 the representative agent solves
max
(c1,c2,c3,θ2,θ3)
u1(c1, c2, c3)
subject to:(9)
c1 + p1θ2 ≤ p1 + d1,
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θ2,
c3 = d3θ3.
Let cˆt(p1, p2), t = 1, 2, 3 and θˆt(p1, p2), t = 2, 3 denote the unique solution (if it exists)
to the preceding maximization problem.
At t = 2 the representative agent solves
max
(c2,c3,θ3)
u2(c2, c3)
subject to:(10)
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θˆ2,
c3 = d3θ3.
With a slight abuse of notation, the unique solution (if it exists) to the precedingmax-
imization problem is denoted by c˜t(p2, θˆ2(p1, p2)) = c˜t(p1, p2), t = 2, 3 and θ˜3(p2, θˆ2(p1, p2)) =
θ˜3(p1, p2).
We say preferences are strongly dynamically inconsistent if for all non-negative c1
the preferences of the representative agent at t = 1 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+ are different
from his preferences at t = 2 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+, or equivalently, for all non-negative
c1,
∂u1
∂c3
(c1,c2,c3)
∂u1
∂c2
(c1,c2,c3)
6=
∂u2
∂c3
(c2,c3)
∂u2
∂c2
(c2,c3)
, (c2, c3)∈ R2+.13
The assumption that in every period the utility function is strictly monotone in
consumption implies that inter-temporal budget constraints are satisfied at equali-
ties in either maximization problem. As before, in a competitive equilibrium, it must
be optimal for both selves of the naive representative agent to hold the entire unit of
13An example of a utility function satisfying this stronger definition would be one
where there is a systematic shift in marginal rates of substitution between c2, c3 when
the representative agent enters period 2, for example, u1(c1, c2, c3) = log c1 + log c2 +
log c3 and u2(c2, c3) = 2 log c2 + log c3.
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the asset in each period (θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1) and consumption must be equal to the
entire paid dividend in each period (c1 = d1, c2 = d2, c3 = d3).
At this point we define two different notions of competitive equilibrium with a
naive representative agent.
Definition 4. A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is a combination of prices (p′1, p
′
2)
and allocations (θ′1, c
′
1, θ
′
2, c
′
2, θ
′
3, c
′
3) such that c
′
1 = cˆ1(p
′
1, p
′
2), θ
′
2 = θˆ2(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
2 =
c˜2(p
′
1, p
′
2),θ
′
3 = θ˜3(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
3 = c˜3(p
′
1, p
′
2) and θ
′
1 = θ
′
2 = θ
′
3 = 1, c
′
1 = d1, c
′
2 = d2, c
′
3 = d3.
Definition 5. A temporary competitive equilibrium is a combination of prices (p′1, p
′
2, p
′′
2)
and allocations (θ′1, c
′
1, θ
′
2, c
′
2, θ
′
3, c
′
3) such that c
′
1 = cˆ1(p
′
1, p
′
2), θ
′
2 = θˆ2(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
2 =
c˜2(p
′
1, p
′′
2),θ
′
3 = θ˜3(p
′
1, p
′′
2), c
′
3 = c˜3(p
′
1, p
′′
2) and θ
′
1 = θ
′
2 = θ
′
3 = 1, c
′
1 = d1, c
′
2 = d2, c
′
3 = d3.
The definition of a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive agent is
new. The definition of a temporary competitive equilibrium corresponds to the no-
tion of a naive equilibrium in Herings and Rohde (2006). The following proposition
establishes that although a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive
representative agent does not exist, a temporary competitive equilibrium does.
Proposition 2. A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a naive representative agent
does not exists, however a temporary competitive equilibrium does.
Proof. At t = 1 as the utility function ut() of the representative agent is smooth and
strictly concave, θˆ2 = θˆ3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following equations:
p′1 = (p
′
2 + d2)
∂u1
∂c1
(d1, d2, d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1, d2, d3)
,
p′2 = d3
∂u1
∂c3
(d1, d2, d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1, d2, d3)
.
Next, observe that at t = 2, θ˜3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following
equations:
p′′2 = d3
∂u2
∂c3
(d2, d3)
∂u2
∂c2
(d2, d3)
.
As preferences are strongly dynamically inconsistent
∂u1
∂c3
(d1,d2,d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1,d2,d3)
6=
∂u2
∂c3
(d2,d3)
∂u2
∂c2
(d2,d3)
and
therefore p′2 6= p′′2 . Therefore market clearing and individual optimization with a
naive representative agent are mutually incompatible if the asset price in the spot
market at t = 2 is the same as the forecast asset price at t = 1. Finally observe that if
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the representative agent forecasts asset prices p′1,p
′
2 while the prevailing asset prices
at t = 2 is p′′2 , individual optimization and market clearing are mutually compati-
ble. 
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